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Comments
Standing up for Our Planet: It’s Time for an
Environmental Standing Doctrine
Aliya Gorelick*
“When the seas envelop our coastal cities, fires and droughts haunt our
interiors, and storms ravage everything between, those remaining will ask: Why
did so many do so little?”1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Earth is at a critical juncture for protecting human life and nature.2 Starting
with the Industrial Revolution in the 1800s, human behavior—from exploiting
natural resources—has raised Earth’s temperature by releasing increasing amounts
of carbon and methane into the atmosphere.3 Earth’s warming temperature
evaporates moisture that would otherwise slow the spread of fires, resulting in
wildfires plaguing the nation.4 To illustrate, Coloradans and Californians saw
record-setting fires during the summer and autumn of 2020.5 On August 16, 2020,
California recorded the highest temperature on Earth to date—130 degrees—in the
aptly named Death Valley.6
As a result of the extreme heat and expansive fires, the Air Quality Index was
such that people could not leave their homes or open their windows for extended
periods without risking serious illness.7 People experienced extensive injuries from
being stuck in their homes due to the poor air quality during the summer of 2020.8
Roofers and construction workers lost income because they could not work in the
smoky conditions.9 In addition to financial hardship, people confined themselves
to their homes during extreme heatwaves, forcing them to run their air conditioning
units more than usual.10 The relationship between the environment’s well-being
2. EDITH BROWN WEISS, DANIEL BARSTOW MAGRAW, STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, STEPHANIE TAI & A.
DAN TARLOCK, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 33 (2016).
3. Id. at 52; Anthropocene, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/ encyclopedia/anthr
opocene/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); The Planet’s
Temperature Is Rising, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/planetstemperature-rising (last visited Sept. 9, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(“Atmospheric [carbon dioxide] levels have risen 30 percent in the last 150 years, with half of that rise occurring
only in the last three decades.”).
4.
Record-Setting Fires in Colorado and California, NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY,
https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/147443/record-setting-fires-in-colorado-and-california (last visited
Sept. 7, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
5. See id. (“Five of the six largest fires in California history have occurred in 2020.”).
6.
National
Weather
Service
Raw
Text
Product,
IOWA
ENVTL.
MESONET,
https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/wx/afos/p.php?pil=PNSVEF&e=202008170128 (last visited Sept. 9, 2020) (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
7. San Joaquin Air Pollution Control District News Release, HEALTHY AIR LIVING, 1, 1 (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://www.valleyair.org/recent_news/Media_releases/2020/PR-Air-Quality-Update-10-15-2020.pdf (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
8. Id.
9. Protecting Workers from Unhealthy Air Due to Wildfire Smoke, PACIFIC NUT PRODUCER,
https://pacificnutproducer.com/2020/08/21/protecting-workers-from-unhealthy-air-due-to-wildfire-smoke/ (last
visited Sept. 9, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); see Wildfire Smoke Effects Could
Have Potential Liability Issues, NAT’L ROOFING CONTRACTORS ASS’N, https://www.nrca.net/RoofingNews/wil
dfire-smoke-effects-could-have-potential-liability-issues-.9-29-2020.8970/Details/Story (last visited Sept. 9,
2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining wildfire smoke halted work on projects
because the air quality index was higher than 600, which is “beyond the upper 500 limit on the Environmental
Protection Agency’s hazardous air quality chart”).
10. See San Joaquin Air Pollution Control District News Release, Healthy Air Living, 1, 1 (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://www.valleyair.org/recent_news/Media_releases/2020/PR-Air-Quality-Update-10-15-2020.pdf (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Anyone experiencing poor air quality due to wildfire smoke
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and human living conditions is apparent, now more than ever.11 Despite natural
disasters, U.S. courts do not recognize their roles in mitigating climate change.12
The current Standing Doctrine has three requirements: (1) injury-in-fact, (2)
causation, and (3) redressability.13 In other words, a plaintiff must show: (1) a real
injury (personal or financial), (2) the defendant caused that injury, and (3) courtprovided relief would completely remedy the injury.14 If a court finds that each of
these three elements is met, then the plaintiff has standing to sue.15 When faced
with the opportunity to act, the Ninth Circuit denied standing because the requested
relief would not single-handedly “solve global climate change.”16 The Ninth
Circuit failed to acknowledge that any solution reducing emissions and preventing
future climate change injuries should satisfy the redressability prong in the current
Standing Doctrine.17
Despite the connection between global emissions and climate change, U.S.
courts maintain a human-centered Standing Doctrine, which says that relief is not
appropriate if it will not completely remedy the injury.18 The Standing Doctrine is
no longer relevant to facilitate the new wave of climate change litigation because
climate change injuries require preventative remedies, rather than remedies to
completely cure climate change.19 The U.S. Supreme Court developed the
Standing Doctrine to deal with situations that differ greatly from climate change
litigation.20 Nevertheless, circuit courts use the current Standing Doctrine to ignore
the growing recognition that courts must remedy climate change injuries
differently than human injuries.21
Climate change poses an existential threat to all living things.22 To combat this
threat, the courts must engage all possible means to stop or greatly curtail activities
should move indoors, to a filtered, air-conditioned environment with the windows closed.”).
11. Robert Roy Britt, The Snowball Effect of Global Warming, LIVE SCIENCE (Sept. 6, 2005),
https://www.livescience.com/9329-snowball-effect-global-warming.html (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (explaining the “snowball effect” whereby ice melts in the arctic due to absorption of
atmospheric emissions causing rising sea levels and damage to coastal cities).
12. Guest Contributors Matt Lifson, Camila Bustos, and Natasha Brunstein: Redressability of Climate
Change Injuries after Juliana, LEGAL PLANET, https://legal-planet.org/2020/06/12/guest-contributors-mattlifson-camila-bustos-and-natasha-brunstein-redressability-of-climate-change-injuries-after-juliana/ (last visited
Sept. 14, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
13. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 590 (1992).
14. Id. at 560–61.
15. Id. at 560.
16. See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1171 (9th Cir. 2020); see Guest Contributors Matt Lifson, Camila Bustos, and
Natasha Brunstein: Redressability of Climate Change Injuries after Juliana, supra note 12 (explaining the Ninth
Circuit dismissed a climate case because the court “lacked the power to order a carbon-reduction plan”).
17. See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1189 (9th Cir. 2020); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 499, 515 (2007).
18. Robert E. Lutz & Stephen C. McCaffrey, Standing on the Side of the Environment: A Statutory
Prescription for Citizen Participation, 1 ECOLOGY LQ. 561, 579 (1971).
19. Id. at 561.
20. Evan T. Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. L. REV.
169, 227 (2012).
21. See Lutz & McCaffrey, supra note 18 at 561.
22. Id. at 564.
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that contribute to climate change.23 One of these means—and perhaps the most
directly democratic one—is to pave the way for litigation aimed at curtailing
climate-unfriendly activities.24 The era of climate change litigation necessitates a
shift towards adopting a new Environmental Standing Doctrine because the
application of the current Standing Doctrine to environmental cases prohibits
effective relief.25
This Comment proposes a new Environmental Standing Doctrine that would
alter standing requirements in environmental cases to ensure effective climate
change litigation.26 The elements for the new Environmental Standing Doctrine
would be: (1) an environmental injury, (2) due to climate change, and (3)
redressable by injunctive relief to lower emissions.27 The new Environmental
Standing Doctrine would allow citizen suits on behalf of generalized
environmental injuries and provide injunctive remedies to lower emissions.28 It
would eliminate the rigid requirements for injury-in-fact to—or directly
affecting—humans in environmental cases.29 Additionally, it would make
reducing pollutants that contribute to climate change the main focus for causation
and redressability.30
Part II of this Comment examines the history and science of climate change by
looking at the nexus between global emissions and rising temperatures.31 It also
explores the international legal framework recognizing the need to mitigate climate
change.32 Part III analyzes U.S. courts’ decisions applying the Standing Doctrine
in environmental suits.33 Finally, Part IV proposes a new Environmental Standing
Doctrine that would alter the requirements for standing in climate change
litigation.34
II. THE HISTORY OF ANTHROPOGENIC CLIMATE CHANGE
Burning fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide, holding it captive in the
atmosphere for centuries.35 Global temperature increases resulting from
imprisoned carbon dioxide cause injuries to the environment and humans alike.36
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 611.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See infra Section II.A.
32. See infra Section II.B.
33. See infra Part III.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. What is the Greenhouse Effect?, NASA CLIMATE KIDS, https://climatekids.nasa.gov/greenhouseeffect/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
36. See Anthropocene, supra note 3.
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Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere acts as a heat-trapping roof, like a greenhouse,
that prevents the natural warming effect of the sun’s rays from escaping the
atmosphere.37 Humans burn fossil fuels, which release carbon dioxide, at a rate
much faster than the environment can sustain.38 Nevertheless, nations—including
the U.S.—historically focused on economic growth rather than slowing the rate of
fossil fuel combustion.39 To explore this further, Section A analyzes evidence
connecting global emissions and climate change.40 Section B explores the
international community’s response to accepting climate science as a call to
action.41
A. Global Emissions Contribute to Climate Change
Geological epochs divide Earth’s history into significant chunks of time.42 The
most recent geological epoch is the Holocene, which began after the last ice age.43
Scientists argue that a new geological epoch—the Anthropocene, starting during
the Industrial Revolution of the 1800s—is now upon humankind.44 The
Anthropocene highlights human impact in its very name, an impact brought about
through carbon dioxide and methane emission increases into Earth’s atmosphere.45
Although scientists debate whether the Industrial Revolution was the exact
beginning of the Anthropocene, it is clear that humans are now a central force
affecting the planet.46
Carbon is the product of fossil fuel combustion—a process that generates heat
and electricity.47 Fossil fuel combustion largely contributes to global warming
37. See What is the Greenhouse Effect?, supra note 35.
38. See Anthropocene, supra note 3.
39. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 607 (Rachel E. Barkow
et al. eds., 5th ed. 2020); see Beth Burger, As Climate Change Escalates, Voters Face a Choice: Deregulate or
Re-regulate, USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/in- depth/news/investigations/2020/10/29
/climate-change-escalates-voters-face-choice-deregulate-re-regulate/3668667001/ (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that the Trump administration denied that climate change was a phenomenon
that existed and reversed the previous administration’s efforts to combat climate change); see also Causes of
Climate Change, CLIMATE SCIENCE INVESTIGATIONS NASA, http://www.ces.fau.edu/nasa/module4/causes/sources-carbon-dioxide.php (last visited Oct. 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (“During combustion or burning [of hydrocarbon fuels like wood, coal, gasoline, and oil] carbon from
fossil fuels combine with oxygen in the air to form carbon dioxide and water vapor.”).
40. See infra Section II.A.
41. See infra Section II.B.
42. See Anthropocene, supra note 3.
43. Id.
44. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 100 (1962); see Anthropocene, supra note 3.
45. See WEISS ET AL., supra note 2, at 1; see Anthropocene, supra note 3.
46. See WEISS ET AL., supra note 2, at 1; Paul J. Crutzen & Christian Shwägerl, Living in the Anthropocene:
Toward a New Global Ethos, YALE ENV’T 360 (Jan. 24, 2011), https://e360.yale.edu/features/living_in_the_ant
hropocene_toward_a_new_global_ethos (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“A decade ago,
Nobel Prize-winning scientist Paul Crutzen first suggested we are living in the ‘Anthropocene,’ a new geological
epoch in which humans had altered the planet.”).
47. ANNE K. ARMSTRONG ET. AL., COMMUNICATING CLIMATE CHANGE 74 (2018).
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because it is a significant contributor to carbon emissions globally.48 Carbon’s
inability to escape into the atmosphere—like a greenhouse confining heat to keep
plants warm—makes it a heat-trapping greenhouse gas.49 Industrial processes like
producing cement, iron, and steel emit carbon by fossil fuel combustion.50 Before
the Industrial Revolution, the atmosphere contained significantly less carbon.51
Now, the rate of carbon entering the atmosphere is raising the global average
temperature rapidly.52
Humans have increased the average temperature on Earth by two degrees
Fahrenheit since 1880, with “two-thirds of the warming occur[ing] since 1975.”53
A two-degree increase in the global temperature is significant because “a one-totwo-degree drop was all it took to plunge the Earth into the Little Ice Age.”54 An
increase in temperatures will result in the elimination of several coastal cities.55
This data directly links Earth’s warming temperature to greenhouse gas
emissions.56 The leading culprits in greenhouse gas emissions are the
transportation, electricity production, and industrial sectors.57 Without sizable
efforts to reduce carbon emissions, the world will likely double the pre-industrial
amount of carbon in the atmosphere before the end of the 21st century, setting in
action a series of natural disasters with it.58

48. Id. at 72.
49. Carbon Dioxide Absorbs and Re-emits Infrared Radiation, CENTER FOR SCIENCE EDUC.,
https://scied.ucar.edu/carbon-dioxide-absorbs-and-re-emits-infrared-radiation (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the greenhouse gas effect, which warms the Earth’s
surface as well as the lower atmosphere).
50. See Anthropocene, supra note 3.
51. See The Planet’s Temperature Is Rising, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/planets-temperature-rising (last visited Sept. 9, 2020) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Atmospheric CO2 levels have risen 30 percent in the last 150 years, with
half of that rise occurring only in the last three decades.”).
52. Rebecca Lindsey, Climate Change: Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., https://www.climate.gov/print/8431 (last visited Oct. 23, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review).
53.
World
of
Change:
Global
Temperatures,
NASA
EARTH
OBSERVATORY,
https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/world-of-change/global-temperatures (last visited Oct. 23, 2020) (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review) (warming at a “rate of roughly 0.15–.20 degrees Celsius per decade,”
which is a very significant rate).
54. Id. (“A one-degree global change is significant because it takes a vast amount of heat to warm all the
oceans, atmosphere, and land by that much.”).
55. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 499 (2007) (“[G]lobal sea between 10 and 20 centimeters over
the 20th century as a result of global warming and have already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land.”).
56.
Emissions
Sources
(2020),
CLIMATE
CENTRAL
(Feb.
19,
2020),
https://www.climatecentral.org/gallery/graphics/emissions-sources-2020 (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (“January 2020 was the hottest January on record globally.”).
57. Id. (“As defined by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. greenhouse gas emissions
sources can be broken down into five sectors: transportation (29%), electricity (28%), industry (22%), commercial
and residential (12%), and agriculture (9%).”).
58. See Lindsey, supra note 52.
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B. International Climate Change: A Call to Action
Like the ecological and environmental stakes, legal and political difficulties in
addressing climate change—domestically and internationally—are enormous.59
The major emitters—accounting for two-thirds of the world’s carbon dioxide
emissions—are the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, and several member countries
within the European Union.60 The tangible effects of climate change include:
oceans rising, ice caps melting, species vanishing, and wildfires spreading.61 A
U.S. government report stated, “[g]reenhouse gas emissions from human activities
are the only factors that can account for the observed warming over the last
century; there are no credible alternative human or natural explanations supported
by the observational evidence.”62 With natural disasters set to continue in
frequency and increase in severity, worldwide efforts are necessary to mitigate
future damage and loss from climate change-related events.63
International climate change discussions began in the 1970s.64 In 1979, the
World Climate Conference first recognized climate change as a serious issue
requiring mitigation.65 The international community—through the United Nations
Environment Programme (“UNEP”)—created the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (“IPCC”).66 The IPCC is a scientific body composed of the
world’s leading experts that prepares reports on climate change and possible
response strategies.67
Following the panel, all United Nations member states collaborated on a
climate change treaty at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June of 1992.68 The
member states ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change on March 21, 1994.69 The signatories to the treaty recognized the
stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions as essential to mitigating climate
change’s impact.70 The treaty created a framework for future protocols, and the
parties to the convention met in Kyoto, Japan to prepare a new treaty.71 This new
agreement, unlike the previous convention, contained specific targets and
timetables to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.72 At this juncture, the U.S.
59. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 603.
60. See id. at 604–05.
61. See id. at 605.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 605.
65. Id.
66. SHULKA J. SKEA ET AL., IPCC, 2019: CLIMATE CHANGE AND LAND (2019).
67. Id.
68. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 39 at 606.
69. Id. at 607.
70. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No, 102–38,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
71. Id.
72. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 605.
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expressed disagreement with emission reduction requirements because it feared
the requirements would “seriously harm the U.S. economy.”73
Most United Nation member states ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2005.74 The
Kyoto Protocol set different emission reduction targets depending on each
country’s respective gross domestic product to provide flexibility in reaching
reduction goals.75 The Clinton administration contested the treaty, and President
George W. Bush confirmed that the U.S. would not ratify it.76 The U.S. was the
only “major industrialized state that did not ratify the protocol.“77 The protocol
was mostly ineffective because—without U.S. participation—the protocol applied
to less than one-third of global emissions.78
Finally, the most recent international treaty regarding climate change is the
Paris Agreement.79 The Paris Agreement is the first treaty to set climate objectives
and an institutional framework to promote ambitious climate goals.80 However, the
Trump administration withdrew the U.S. from the Paris Agreement on November
4, 2020 because President Trump claimed the “deal imposed draconian financial
and economic burdens on the U.S.”81 The U.S. rejoined the Paris Agreement on
February 19, 2021 under the Biden Administration.82
International agreements on climate change encourage signatories to honor
agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.83 This means that instead of
creating an enforceable contract, treaties operate more like an unenforceable
promise.84 The government of each signatory country has the discretion to make
strides towards the treaty’s goals.85 Therefore, governments have no concrete
obligation to work towards global climate initiatives if it is not in their political
interest.86
The nature of non-enforceable treaties is precisely why critics predict that the
Paris Agreement will fail, just like the Kyoto Protocol.87 A major pitfall in the Paris
73. A U.S.-Centric Chronology of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, CONG.
RES. SERV. 4 (Nov. 8, 2013), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40001 (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review).
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 609 (explaining that the U.S. would “address climate change
through domestic policy” instead).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 610–11.
80. Id. at 611.
81. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 618.
82. Melissa Denchak, Paris Climate Agreement: Everything You Need to Know, NAT.’L RES. DEF.
COUNCIL (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/paris-climate-agreement-everything-you-need-know (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
83. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 39 at 618.
84. Id. at 609–13.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Denchak, supra note 82.
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Agreement is that it does not specify how countries should cut emissions.88 The
discretion in the Paris Agreement means more countries will become signatories.89
When there are more signatories it is less likely that individual countries will
achieve the treaties’ climate initiatives.90 Even developed nations with climate
plans that include binding emission reduction targets often fail to achieve
ambitious emission reduction goals set out in treaties.91
U.S. courts, with the rise of climate litigation, have an opportunity to address
the climate crisis where treaties are not able to.92 Emission reduction remedies will
give climate-vulnerable communities the right to demand efforts from the current
administration to reach national emission reduction goals.93 Without an
enforcement mechanism in U.S. courts, it is unlikely that the U.S. will reach the
global climate initiatives in the Paris Agreement.94
III. CASE STUDY: CLIMATE SUITS IN THE UNITED STATES
The U.S. Constitution vests the judiciary with the power to adjudicate cases or
controversies in federal courts.95 The current Standing Doctrine is essential to the
Constitution’s Article III case or controversy requirement.96 The current Standing
Doctrine asks whether a party can present a cause of action sufficient to allow them
to advocate and “stand” before a court.97 There must be: (1) injury-in-fact, (2)
causation, and (3) redressability for a court to find standing.98 In more detail,
standing requires: (1) a concrete, particularized injury-in-fact, (2) a connection
between the defendant and the injury, and (3) a remedy that will make the plaintiff
whole.99 A plaintiff must show that the injury affects them in a personal and
adversarial way—element one.100 Courts often considers causation and
redressability—elements two and three—jointly because a remedy that makes the
plaintiff whole should directly address the root cause of the injury.101

88. Id.
89. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 609–13.
90. Id.
91. Id. (explaining that nations observe the terms of treaties because it is in their interest to do so).
92. Id. at 618; Marisa Martin & James Landman, Standing: Who Can Sue to Protect the Environment?,
AM. BAR ASS’N (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/insights-onlaw-and-society/volume-19/insights-vol--19---issue-1/standing--who-can-sue-to-protect-the-environment-/ (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
93. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 618.
94. Id.
95. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
96. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
97. See Martin et al., supra note 92.
98. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 587 (1992).
99. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741–742 (1972); see Martin et al., supra note 92.
100. See Martin et al., supra note 92.
101. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
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The Supreme Court found standing—injury, causation, and redressability—in
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency where the plaintiff presented
a non-economic, environmental injury.102 Additionally, in Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency, the Supreme Court held that redressability was
met in climate change cases with an emission reduction remedy.103 The Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Juliana v. United States, however, stated that a piecemeal
approach—an emission reduction remedy—was not appropriate.104 The Ninth
Circuit’s decision contradicts the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that finding
redressability in environmental cases differs greatly from non-environmental
cases.105 The disparity between the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of standing illustrates the pitfalls of not having a separate Standing
Doctrine for environmental cases.106 Section A explains that the Ninth Circuit
failed to follow the Supreme Court’s instruction to interpret the current Standing
Doctrine broadly for environmental cases.107 Section B explains that the current
Standing Doctrine should not apply to environmental cases because inconsistent
interpretation will stunt climate change litigation.108
A. The Inconsistent Interpretation of the Current Standing Doctrine in
Environmental Cases
One of the first cases where the Supreme Court did not find standing in an
environmental lawsuit was in Sierra Club v. Morton.109 In this case, the plaintiffs—
an environmental organization—stated that the defendant’s plan to build a ski
resort in a forested area would harm the plaintiffs’ special interest in forest
conservation.110 The reason why the organization did not have standing hinged on
the organization’s failure to explicitly allege that developing a ski resort would
directly affect its members.111 The Court expressed that the injury was not concrete
and particularized because the plaintiffs did not claim the injury to the forested
area was an actual injury to the plaintiffs.112 Although the Court held that there
was no standing, the dissenting Justice Douglas became the first Justice to advocate

102. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 519–20; see infra Section III.A; see also Martin et al., supra
note 92.
103. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 499.
104. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1189.
105. See infra Section III.A; see also infra Section III.B; DINA GILIO-WHITAKER, AS LONG AS GRASS
GROWS 154 (2019); Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1171; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 515.
106. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1191; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522.
107. See infra Section III.A; see also Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1171. But see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
at 499.
108. See infra Section III.B.
109. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 734–35.
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for the environment by recognizing the need to broaden standing requirements in
environmental cases.113
Following Sierra Club, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court
held that non-economic injuries could present injury-in-fact as long as the
plaintiff’s injury was one of recreation, conservation, or aesthetic environmental
harm.114 In Lujan, environmental activists sued to challenge an interpretation of
the Endangered Species Act because the U.S. Department of Interior claimed it did
not apply to foreign nations.115 Plaintiffs were activists who recently traveled to
Egypt and Sri Lanka and had an interest in protecting foreign endangered
species.116 The Court strictly interpreted standing in Lujan by concluding the
plaintiffs’ purported intent to return to those foreign nations was insufficient to
present actual injury-in-fact.117 Without a plane ticket to Egypt and Sri Lanka, the
Court claimed that the interest in ecosystem sustainability was not actual or
imminent for injury-in-fact.118
In Lujan, the Court “established that the irreducible constitutional minimum
of standing contains three elements”: injury, causation, and redressability—or the
Lujan Three-Part Test.119 First, the injury-in-fact must be “actual or imminent, not
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”120 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
injury is concrete and uniquely particularized to the plaintiff.121 Second, the injury
must be fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions.122 Third, redressability must
make the plaintiff whole with a favorable decision to remedy the harm.123
In 2000, the Supreme Court expanded its strict interpretation of the Lujan
Three-Part-Test in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Service,
Inc.124 The Court found injury-in-fact where the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System’s violation of mercury discharge limits—in violation of the
Clean Water Act—restricted recreational use of the river.125 The plaintiff’s injury-

113. See id. at 760–61 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[A]re we to be rendered helpless to consider and evaluate
allegations and challenges of this kind because of procedural limitations rooted in traditional concepts of
standing?”).
114. See Martin et al., supra note 92.
115. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 587.
116. Id. at 563.
117. Id. at 592.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 560–61.
120. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
121. See id. (requiring that the injury cannot broadly apply to a class of people and it must specifically
affect the plaintiff in a personalized and individual way).
122. Id. at 560.
123. Id. at 561.
124. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’l Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 169 (2000); Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 560–61 (1992); see Martin et al., supra note 92.
125. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 184–85; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (explaining associational
standing when members have standing in their own right, that the interests asserted are related to the
organization’s purpose, and that the case does not require participation of individual members).
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in-fact was the inability to use the river for recreational activities.126 The Court
found that penalties deterring mercury pollution satisfied both, thereby giving the
plaintiffs recreational access to the river.127 Friends of the Earth builds on Justice
Douglas’ dissent in Sierra Club, emphasizing that recreational injuries can qualify
as an injury-in-fact as a way to promote environmental preservation.128
The plaintiffs in Friends of the Earth achieved standing where the plaintiffs in
Lujan did not.129 In Lujan, the Court decided that the plaintiff’s concerns about the
foreign endangered species preservation did not qualify as injury-in-fact.130
Whereas, in Friends of the Earth, the Court found injury-in-fact from the plaintiff’s
“reasonable concerns” about the inability to use the river due to mercury
pollution.131 Turning to this reasonable concern standard shows that the Court is
comfortable expanding injury-in-fact requirements so long as there is a closely
related personal injury that stems from the environmental harm.132 This shift to the
reasonable concern standard demonstrates a trend towards recognizing that
plaintiffs can establish injury-in-fact through showing solely environmental
harm.133
The Supreme Court found standing—injury-in-fact, causation, and
redressability—in the global warming case Massachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency.134 This case was a landmark decision because the Supreme
Court recognized carbon dioxide as a pollutant within the meaning of the Clean
Air Act.135 The Court ruled the Environmental Protection Agency had the authority
to regulate greenhouse gases.136 The plaintiff, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, demonstrated injury-in-fact by presenting environmental harm—
rising sea levels consuming coastal areas within the state.137 The Supreme Court
agreed the state’s injuries continue to increase with rising global temperatures. 138
The Court stated that any remedy that slows global emissions is sufficient to

126. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 184–85.
127. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 186–87.
128. See Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 169. But see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 556; see also Sierra Club,
405 U.S. at 741–42.
129. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 556.
130. Id. at 592 (deeming intent to visit a foreign country to be a speculative injury because the plaintiffs
did not purchase plane tickets to revisit Egypt and Sri Lanka).
131. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 169.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 497.
135. Id. at 529.
136. Id. at 500–01.
137. See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1191 (“When the seas envelop our coastal cities, fires and droughts haunt
our interiors, and storms ravage everything between, those remaining will ask: Why did so many do so little?”);
see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 541 (demonstrating personal injury and hardship through coastal
property destruction due to global sea levels rising).
138. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 501 (acknowledging that a significant percentage of
greenhouse gas emissions were due to motor vehicles and transportation sector emissions).
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redress climate harms, satisfying causation and redressability.139 This case showed
the potential for demonstrating standing under the current Standing Doctrine in
climate change cases and inspired other citizen suits for climate change
litigation.140
However, the Ninth Circuit did not follow the Supreme Court’s lead in
Juliana.141 In Juliana, youth plaintiffs alleged climate change injuries—property
damage from ocean levels rising that led to a village flooding—and sought relief
from the government to reduce carbon emissions domestically.142 The Ninth
Circuit dismissed Juliana, concluding that although the plaintiffs did have injuryin-fact, they did not adequately present causation and redressability.143 The Ninth
Circuit claimed that an Article III court could not remedy specific climate change
injuries.144
The holding in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency—where
the Supreme Court conceded that global emission reduction remedies are
appropriate in climate change suits—directly cuts against the Ninth Circuit’s
response in Juliana.145 If the Ninth Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s lead in
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Ninth Circuit would have
granted an emission reduction remedy to the plaintiffs in Juliana.146 Instead, the
Ninth Circuit said the problem—climate change—was too large for the court to
redress.147 The Ninth Circuit’s logic is flawed because the Supreme Court
previously declared that emission reduction remedies are appropriate in climate
change cases.148 The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the current Standing Doctrine
shows that circuit courts’ discretion should be limited regarding whether to award
adequate remedies for climate change injuries.149 Courts should grant emission
reduction remedies where there are climate change injuries because the scientific
community and the Supreme Court agree that greenhouse gas emissions increase
global temperatures.150

139. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 515.
140. See Martin et al., supra note 92.
141. See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1182–83, 1191 (Staton, J. dissenting) (refusing to find environmental injuries
redressable by reducing global emissions).
142. See Guest Contributors Matt Lifson, Camila Bustos, and Natasha Brunstein: Redressability of
Climate Change Injuries after Juliana, supra note 12 (holding that redressability that “would not solve global
climate change” was not worth awarding).
143. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1171.
144. See id. at 1177 (“[T]he relief sought is too great and unsusceptible to a judicially administrable
standard.”).
145. See id. at 1171 (claiming that the plaintiffs’ injuries are not redressable because the remedy will not
single-handedly solve climate change). But see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 525 (finding the plaintiffs
injury redressable through reducing carbon emissions to slow global warming emissions increases).
146. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1189; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 525.
147. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1177.
148. Id. at 1182; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 515.
149. See Martin et al., supra note 92.
150. Id.
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The danger lies in circuit courts failing to award emission reduction remedies
to credible plaintiffs and climate-vulnerable communities.151 The Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning operates under a strict interpretation of the current Standing Doctrine by
claiming that a remedy must completely eradicate the injury, even in climate
change cases.152 That interpretation of redressability directly contradicts the
Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,
where reducing emissions for climate change injuries was a sufficient remedy.153
The current Standing Doctrine is outdated—as applied to environmental cases—
because the strict requirements of the current doctrine lead to inconsistent
interpretation in climate change litigation.154 The inability to access consistent
judicial remedies for climate harms denies citizens the right to a healthy
environment.155
B. The Current Standing Doctrine Does Not Recognize the Imperatives of
Today’s Climate-Changed World
The judiciary created the current Standing Doctrine, requiring a case or
controversy, to prevent courts from making policy decisions about which cases
deserve their day in court.156 Separation of powers prevents one branch of
government’s roles and duties from bleeding into another branch’s roles and
duties.157 The current Standing Doctrine intends to be a tool for limiting the courts’
power.158 In theory, it should confine judicial discretion.159 Instead of confining
judicial discretion, the current Standing Doctrine expands judicial discretion in
environmental cases.160 With greater judicial discretion, courts make more policybased decisions.161 Policy-based decisions and greater judicial discretion are
improper because they encourage courts to employ strict standing requirements
that are not conducive to climate change litigation.162
The current Standing Doctrine is inappropriate in climate change litigation
because the Supreme Court did not create the doctrine with climate change
151. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1184–85.
152. Id. at 1182; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 583 (failing to acknowledge that environmental injuries yield
different demands than personal or financial injuries).
153. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1172; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 515.
154. See Guest Contributors Matt Lifson, Camila Bustos, and Natasha Brunstein: Redressability of
Climate Change Injuries after Juliana, supra note 12; see Martin et al., supra note 92.
155. Francisco Benzoni, Environmental Standing: Who Determines the Value of Other Life?, DUKE L.
SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY (2008), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1071&context
=delpf (last visited Dec. 4, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Benzoni, supra note 155.
162. Id.
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litigation in mind.163 A surefire way to expand standing requirements for climate
change litigation is to judicially create a new Environmental Standing Doctrine
that focuses on environmental injury and environmental redressability.164 The
current Standing Doctrine requires that injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability
focus only on human injury.165
Under the current Standing Doctrine, a plaintiff in an environmental case must
present injuries to and redressability for the plaintiff’s injury.166 This modality is
based on the idea that humans and nature are mutually exclusive concepts in
Article III courts.167 The current Standing Doctrine, as it applies to environmental
cases, encourages courts to provide value judgments by requiring an underlying
human injury to achieve environmental redressability.168 By separating humans
from nature, courts must make decisions that would generally be a function of the
political process through elected government officials.169 However, court-made
value judgments are historically destructive, rather than protective, of
ecosystems.170
When the judiciary makes value judgments between businesses and
environmental entities, the courts often lean towards big corporations’ economic
protectionism, leaving people and the environment exposed, vulnerable, and
polluted.171 Although courts are not making a detailed cost-benefit analysis, they
are engaging in free-market environmentalism where value judgments equate
money with all things good.172 It is impracticable to assign a dollar value to human
life or the environment—as all moral algebraic formulas cannot account for the
priceless features of life or nature.173
The ethical and moral pitfalls of the current Standing Doctrine in
environmental cases give Article III courts the power to decide what is and is not
worthy of legal protection.174 The current Standing Doctrine compels courts to find
no injury-in-fact, despite ecosystem destruction, simply because there is no

163. Id.
164. See infra Part IV.
165. See Benzoni, supra note 155.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. (making judgements based on human need for resources [i.e., anthropocentrism] rather than human
reliance, dependence, and responsibility to maintain and preserve resources [i.e., biocentrism]).
170. See FRANK AKERMAN & LISA HENZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING
AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 15 (2004) (judging values comes from the economic theory that promotes
competitive markets and efficiency at all costs).
171. See id. at 17 (explaining that economics-minded value judgements result in impersonal market forces
that often threaten health and nature).
172. See id. at 19 (describing a theory which started in the first Bush Administration of making protecting
the environment more efficient by saying “you can have as much environmental protection as you are willing to
pay for”).
173. See id. at 202.
174. See Benzoni, supra note 155.
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immediately apparent human injury.175 To protect the environment through the
legal system and the current Standing Doctrine, a person must bring a claim
couched in human self-interest.176 The fundamentally unchanged current Standing
Doctrine—established in 1922—does not place explicit value in environmental
preservation or conservation, even as a factor to sustain human well-being on
Earth.177
The current context of climate change and the devastation it will continue to
wreak demonstrates that the current Standing Doctrine is no longer relevant in
environmental cases.178 It is imperative in this climate-changed world for plaintiffs
to have the ability to bring suits that are not directly couched in human selfinterest.179 The new Environmental Standing Doctrine would allow the
environment to be the main focus for injury-in-fact, causation, and
redressability.180 The ability to sue on behalf of environmental injury alone, absent
human injury, would work prophylactically to mitigate climate change injuries like
sea-level rise and wildfire destruction.181
IV. THE ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING DOCTRINE: A NEW STANDING DOCTRINE
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE CASES
Combatting the harmful effects of climate change requires judicial adoption of
a new Environmental Standing Doctrine for environmental cases.182 The
Environmental Standing Doctrine would allow environmental injuries alone to
satisfy injury-in-fact and it would provide emission reduction remedies to satisfy
causation and redressability.183 Creating a new doctrine is the most efficient avenue
to facilitate climate change litigation because urging courts to broaden their
interpretation of the current Standing Doctrine in environmental cases is
unreliable.184 The Ninth Circuit’s decision not to redress climate change injuries in
Juliana shows that a new doctrine for environmental cases would be more
persuasive than a trends in dicta or interpretation.185 The judicial adoption of the
Environmental Standing Doctrine is viable because standing itself is a judicially
created doctrine.186 Additionally, the Court created logical outgrowths of

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See infra Part IV.
181. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1191; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 526.
182. See Lee et al., supra note 20, at 214 (“Much, if not most, of the public law professoriate regards the
Article III standing doctrine as intellectually bankrupt.”).
183. See infra Section IV.B.
184. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1177; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 515.
185. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1177); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 515.
186. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; See Lee et al., supra note, 20 at 223.
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individual standing, including: organizational standing, third-party standing, and
federal taxpayer standing.187
The U.S. needs a framework that enables mitigation for climate change
injuries—including massive wildfires and sea-level rise to air pollution and rising
temperatures.188 The current Standing Doctrine’s inadequacies expose the need for
a doctrine that legally solidifies the connection between global emissions and
climate change.189 The new Environmental Standing Doctrine proposed in this
Comment would broaden standing requirements by focusing on making the
environment whole and providing injunctive emission reduction remedies.190 The
Environmental Standing Doctrine would emphasize the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of standing in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency to
constrain circuit courts’ discretion in environmental cases.191 Part A explains who
can be parties to the suit under the new Environmental Standing Doctrine.192 Part
B describes how parties can present injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability for
a climate change suit that relies on the new Environmental Standing Doctrine.193
A. Legal Personhood: Citizen Suits on Behalf of the Environment
Citizens need an Environmental Standing Doctrine because government
regulation is not a failsafe for mitigating climate change injuries.194 A private
citizen needs the ability to challenge enforcement efforts when the government is
not actively pursuing or achieving goals set out in the national climate plan.195
Without the ability for citizens to demand action from the President or state
governors, the government can ignore the will of the people, including their public
interest in a safe and healthy environment.196 Under the new Environmental
Standing Doctrine, plausible defendants would include any state government, the
national government, industry sectors, polluters, and corporations.197
When discussing the potential for government defendants, it is necessary to
address how the Environmental Standing Doctrine would overcome sovereign
187. Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 107 (2014).
188. See Lee et al., supra note 20, at 192.
189. Id.
190. Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 456 (1972).
191. See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 515 (laying the foundation for recognizing
environmental injuries and legal redressability that flows therefrom).
192. See infra Section IV.A.
193. See infra Section IV.B.
194. See Lutz & McCaffrey, supra note 18, at 575.
195. Id. at 571.
196. Id. at 575.
197. Geetanjali Ganguly et. al., If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations, 38 Oxford J. of Legal
Stud. 841, 865 (2018); Meredith Wilensky, Climate Change in the Courts: An Assessment of Non-U.S. Climate
Litigation, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L. (Feb. 2015), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/
microsites/climate-change/white_paper_-_climate_change_in_the_courts_-assessment_of_non_u.s._climate_liti
gation.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).

195

2021 / Standing up for Our Planet
immunity roadblocks.198 Sovereign immunity protects the U.S. government from
lawsuits unless the government waives its immunity.199 However, in Juliana, the
plaintiffs started the lawsuit by suing the Oregon state government.200 On the state
level, and following Juliana’s lead, plaintiffs will not run into sovereign immunity
issues because not all states in the U.S. adopt the sovereign immunity doctrine.201
The issues involved in suing the national government are pronounced and
require long-term resolutions to come forth as environmental rights, standing
alone, become more customary.202 One possibility is to prove that the government
has a statutory duty of care by bringing a public negligence argument.203 This
would be more feasible in a country like the Netherlands or Ireland, where the
constitution provides their citizens the right to a healthy environment.204 There is
surely room to interpret the right to a healthy environment into the U.S.
Constitution.205 Until then, plaintiffs can bring suit against their state governments,
industry sectors, polluters, and corporations.206
Adopting an Environmental Standing Doctrine necessitates a shift towards
giving natural objects standing in their own right.207 Societies fear giving new
entities legal rights.208 The more new entities possess legal rights, the less power
majority rights holders retain.209 Although unconventional now, giving legal rights
to trees, oceans, and rivers is the next step towards significant domestic and
international litigation to protect the environment.210
Giving natural objects standing in their own right aligns with the principle that
human rights and environmental rights are intertwined.211 Under the
198. Giulio Corsi, The New Wave of Climate Change Litigation: A Transferability Analysis, IPCC 6 (Oct.
2017), https://www.sipotra.it/old/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/The-New-Wave-of-Climate-Change-LitigationA-Transferability-Analysis.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Anna Kusmer, Activists Took the Irish Government to Court Over Its National Climate Plan—And
Won, WORLD (Aug. 13, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-08-13/activists-took-irish-govt-courtover-its-national-climate-plan-and-won (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); Climate Case,
CLIMATE CASE IR., https://www.climatecaseireland.ie (last visited Apr. 15, 2021) (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review); see Corsi, supra note 198, at 6.
205. Id. at 3.
206. Id. at 2.
207. See Stone, supra note 90, at 456 (illustrating that legal rights should be given to natural objects such
as rivers and trees).
208. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 294 (1955) (holding that racial discrimination
is unconstitutional and thereby affording Black children legal rights to an equal education system). See generally
BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 104 (1963) (fearing the loss of housewife duties if women were given
the right to vote).
209. See FRIEDAN, supra note 208, at 366 (allowing women to pursue other avenues of work and
education—during womens suffrage—meant they spent less time at home).
210. Id. at 107; Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. at 294; see Stone, supra note 190, at 456.
211. See Stone, supra note 190, at 455–57.
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Environmental Standing Doctrine, natural objects would possess legal rights,
much like corporations possess rights from judicially interpreted constitutional
legal personhood.212 Legal personhood is a legal fiction where courts recognize an
entity’s entitlement to legal protection—specifically conservation in the context of
the environment.213 Giving the environment legal personhood is a trending reality
across the globe.214 For example, in Ecuador and New Zealand, courts recognize
that rivers and forests are legal entities with standing in their own right.215 The
incentive lies in the benefit of community activism through citizen suits to ensure
the long-term wellbeing of the environment.216
B. The New Environmental Standing Doctrine
The current, antiquated Standing Doctrine requires a concrete and
particularized human injury—economic or physical—and a remedy that will
completely cure the plaintiff.217 The Ninth Circuit in Juliana showed that there is
no incentive to interpret the current Standing Doctrine broadly in environmental
cases.218 The Supreme Court ultimately possesses the power to judicially create a
new Environmental Standing Doctrine.219 The Court should adopt a new legal
doctrine for environmental cases because environmental integrity is the predicate
for humanity and other forms of life, and the current Standing Doctrine does not
reflect that.220
This Comment proposes a new Environmental Standing Doctrine that would
provide citizens with an avenue to hold the government, polluting entities, and the
aggregate community accountable for reaching national climate plan goals.221 The
requirements for the new Environmental Standing Doctrine are: (1) an
environmental injury, (2) caused climate change, and (3) injunctive emission
reduction remedies that could redress the issue.222 Unlike the current Standing
Doctrine requiring personal injury for injury-in-fact, the new Environmental
Standing Doctrine would allow a purely environmental injury to satisfy injury-in-

212. Id. at 458 (“that the thing can institute legal actions at its behest; second, that in determining the
granting of legal relief, the court must take injury to it into account; and, third, that relief must run to the benefit
of it”); see also Garrett, supra note 187, at 107 (explaining how the U.S. Constitution grants legal personhood to
corporate entities so that they may possess rights and engage in litigation).
213. Emilie Blake, Are Water Body Personhood Rights the Future of Water Management in the United
States, 47 TEX. ENV’T L.J. 197, 198 (2017).
214. Id. at 199.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; see Lee et al., supra note 20, at 214.
218. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1172; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 515.
219. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1177; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 515; Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528
U.S. at 169; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
220. See Lee et al., supra note 20, at 217.
221. See supra Part IV.
222. See infra Subsection IV.B.1; see infra Subsection IV.B.2.
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fact.223 The new Environmental Standing Doctrine would promote the legal
recognition of climate science in the courts by acknowledging that reducing
emissions will slow the rate of global warming.224
Courts can employ injunctive emission reduction remedies under the new
Environmental Standing Doctrine.225 Section 1 illustrates that injury-in-fact under
the new Environmental Standing Doctrine would encompass environmental injury
absent human injury.226 Section 2 explains that injunctive emission reduction
remedies would satisfy causation and redressability under the new Environmental
Standing Doctrine.227
1. Broadening Injury-in-fact to Include Environmental Injuries
Environmental injury alone—domestically and internationally—should
establish injury-in-fact because human rights and environmental rights are more
intertwined than the law currently recognizes.228 Article III courts need an
Environmental Standing Doctrine because the current Standing Doctrine does not
encourage lawsuits on behalf of the environment absent direct economic, personal
injury to humans.229 This proposed Environmental Standing Doctrine will permit
lawsuits on behalf of environmental harm.230 International human rights law
supports the proposition for a new Environmental Standing Doctrine because
environmental harm affects transboundary populations.231 Preventing citizen suits
on behalf of the environment by requiring human injury undermines private
citizens’ rights to challenge governmental institutions who are responsible for
managing environmental quality.232 Therefore, the new Environmental Standing
Doctrine would only require environmental injury to prove injury-in-fact.233
Instead of harnessing politics to promote sustainability and human welfare,
natural resources often double as political weapons.234 This sentiment illustrates
why it is necessary for the Environmental Standing Doctrine to legally recognize
environmental personhood as a means of finding environmental injury sufficient

223. See infra Subsection IV.B.1.
224. See infra Subsection IV.B.2.
225. See infra Subsection IV.B.2.
226. See infra Subsection IV.B.1.
227. See infra Subsection IV.B.2.
228. Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implications, 5 GEO.
INT’L ENV’T L. REV. 1, 3 (1992).
229. See generally Stone, supra note 190, at 458 (explaining the need for direct injury to humans to be
present to prosecute).
230. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528, U.S. at 169; see McCaffrey, supra note 228, at 19.
231. See McCaffrey, supra note 228, at 19.
232. See Lutz & McCaffrey, supra note 18, at 562–65 (failing to allow suits without direct human injury—
the standard under the current Standing Doctrine—prevents society from protecting things outside of the agenda
of the economically powerful).
233. See McCaffrey, supra note 228, at 7.
234. Id. at 6.
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to sustain standing.235 For example, the United Nations General Assembly stated
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that “everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his
family . . . .”236 This sentiment demonstrates humans’ innate dependence on the
government’s sustainable management of Earth’s resources.237 Enforcement of
universal human rights—such as the right to a healthy environment suitable to
sustain future generations—requires courts to legally recognize that human
injuries and environmental injuries are one and the same.238 The fundamental
human right to a healthy environment is integral to the Stockholm Declaration on
the Human Environment:
The natural resources of the earth including the air, water, land, flora, and
fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems must be
safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generation[s] through
careful planning or management as appropriate.239
The Environmental Standing Doctrine would allow an environmental injury to
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing in recognition that protection of
natural resources is an integral aspect of human welfare, even absent a showing of
direct human injury.240
2. Causation and Redressability: Reducing Emissions to Make the
Environment Whole
Sustainable development in the Anthropocene depends on a legal recognition
that pollutants contribute to climate change.241 The legal recognition must work in
tandem with a political commitment to provide a framework to bring suit for the
environment and against entities polluting—or failing to sanction polluting—at
alarming rates.242 Section i discusses how the Environmental Standing Doctrine
would mandate that courts legally recognize that pollutants and emissions directly

235. See Stone, supra note 190, at 455 (explaining the preconception that the legal personhood of the
environment is a foreign concept); see also McCaffrey, supra note 228, at 24 (drawing a link between the impact
of environmental health on human well-being).
236. Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/64 (1948); see also McCaffrey, supra note
228, at 8.
237. See also McCaffrey, supra note 228, at 8 (explaining a general assembly resolution regarded as
customary international law that outline clear human rights).
238. See id. at 15.
239.
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, at 3 (June 1972).
240. Id.; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Dec. 10, 1948).
241. Global Climate Litigation, URGENDA, https://www.urgenda.nl/en/themas/climate-case/globalclimate-litigation/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
242. See WEISS ET AL., supra note 2, at 33.

199

2021 / Standing up for Our Planet
cause climate change.243 Section ii provides that acceptable remedies under the
Environmental Standing Doctrine include emission reduction injunctions. 244
a. Causation: Legally Recognizing Climate Science
The Environmental Standing Doctrine would battle investment influence by
removing the courts’ causation analysis in climate change litigation.245 Instead,
courts would operate under the understanding that emissions directly increase
global temperatures.246 This would take the guesswork and political jeopardy out
of connecting the dots between emissions, global warming, climate change, and
environmental injuries.247 The notion of finding causation draws directly from the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of climate science from the Clean Air Act in
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency.248 It is necessary to find
causation in climate change litigation under the Environmental Standing Doctrine
to prevent circuit courts from exercising improper discretion due to investment
influence—like the Ninth Circuit’s majority decision in Juliana v. U.S.249
The attorneys and plaintiffs in Juliana plan to bring the case before the U.S.
Supreme Court or to settlement discussions with the Biden-Harris
administration.250 After filing the landmark case on International Youth Day in
2015, the youth plaintiffs Administration’s defense. giant fossil fuel companies
came to the Trump One plaintiff said, “[s]eeing giant fossil fuel corporations
inject themselves into this case, which is about our future, really demonstrates the
problem we are trying to fix.”252 Despite multiple amicus curiae briefs filed in
support of the youth’s landmark constitutional climate lawsuit and the U.S.
government’s long-standing knowledge of climate danger, the six-year- old case
has not yet seen its day in court.253 The U.S. needs a new Environmental Standing
Doctrine because of previous Administrations’ unwillingness to acknowledge
climate science—that fossil fuel emissions cause global temperature
243. See infra Subsection IV.B.2.ii.
244. See infra Subsection IV.B.2.ii.
245. See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1171(failing to understand that anything that lowers emissions remedies
climate change and that it is a fundamental misunderstanding to only issue a remedy if it will fix the entire problem
in the environmental context). But see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 515 (recognizing the causation between
emissions and climate change and conceding that any remedy that works to lower emissions sufficiently remedies
injuries in a climate change litigation context).
246. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 497.
247. Id. at 525.
248. Id.; 42 U.S.C.A. § 7661.
249. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1189 (Staton, J., dissenting).
250. See Global Climate Litigation, supra note 241; Legal Actions, OUR CHILDREN’S TR.,
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/juliana-v-us (last visited Jan. 15, 2021) (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review).
251. See Details of Proceedings, OUR CHILDREN’S TR., https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/federalproceedings (last visited Jan 15, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (following the
developments in the Juliana versus United States lawsuit).
252. Id.
253. Id. (acquiring eight amicus curiae briefs filed in favor of the youth plaintiffs by the “legal scholars,
religious, women’s, libertarian, and environmental groups, alongside legal nonprofits”).

200

University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 53

increases.254 This is necessary to undercut the influence of investments from oil
and gas companies that currently stain political autonomy in the courts.255
The U.S. judiciary, with the Environmental Standing Doctrine, would join a
global trend by conceding that emissions cause climate change.256 Lawyers, on
behalf of youth and climate-affected plaintiffs across the globe, are now bringing
climate change lawsuits against their governments for failures to adequately
mitigate climate change injuries.257 In Ireland, a group of activists won a judgment
rendering the Irish government’s national climate plan insufficient.258 Ireland’s
Climate Minister Eamon Ryan said, “[W]e must use this judgement to raise
ambition, to empower action and to ensure that our shared future delivers a better
quality life for all.”259 The case—commonly rereferred to as Climate Case
Ireland—is the “first case of its kind in Ireland and only the second case in the
WORLD in which the highest national court of law has required a government to
revise its national climate policy in light of its legal obligations.”260
Courts across the world legally recognize climate science.261 The U.S.
government, on the other hand, is far less receptive to conceding and legally
recognizing that emissions cause climate change.262 Funding from polluting
entities puts political restraint on the judiciary and the President.263 The epidemic
of investment influence from oil and gas companies stunts climate change
litigation.264 It is time for courts to judicially adopt the Environmental Standing
Doctrine to avoid stunting climate change litigation.265

254. See Matthew H. Goldberg et al., Oil and Gas Companies Invest in Legislators That Vote Against the
Environment, in 117 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIENCES 5111, 5111 (François M. M. Morel et al. eds., 10th ed. 2020)
(describing the political attitude towards climate science).
255. Id. (revisiting past court rulings on the economic impact of environmental regulations on oil
companies).
256. See Global Climate Litigation, supra note 241 (describing citizens around the world “taking their
governments to court over their insufficient climate policies”).
257. Id. (describing the youth worldwide who are pursuing litigation for climate-related injuries).
258. Id. (claiming the government’s lack of action “to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is a violation of
Ireland’s Climate Act, the Irish Constitution, and governmental obligations under the European Convention on
Human Rights”).
259. See Kusmer, supra note 204.
260. Id.
261. See Global Climate Litigation, supra note 241.
262. Id.
263. See Goldberg et al., supra note 254, at 5111(explaining that large corporations take full advantage of
the ruling in Citizen United versus Federal Election Commission where the Supreme Court decided that
investment money for political communication is protected speech under the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution).
264. Id. (“For every additional 10% of congressional votes against the environment in 2014, a legislator
would receive an additional $5,400 in campaign contributions from oil and gas companies in 2016” which is “an
especially strong relationship considering that many elected officials vote against environmental policies 100%
of the time, thereby compounding the cycle of antienvironmentalism and increasing the rewards in the form of
contributions.”).
265. See id. (examining how politics influence a politician’s willingness to support environmentally
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b. Redressability: Injunctive Emission Reduction Remedies
Redressability—the third requirement in standing—refers to the remedies a
court can grant, upon request, to make the plaintiff whole.266 Remedies under the
Environmental Standing Doctrine would include injunctive emission reduction
remedies.267 Emission reduction remedies build upon the foundation in which the
courts legally recognize climate change.268 Two prominent emissions reduction
frameworks at play in the global community are cap-and-trade systems and carbon
taxes.269 These two approaches are actively reducing emissions internationally and
would be models for injunctions that the judiciary could employ under the
Environmental Standing Doctrine.270 This subsection will give an overview of capand-trade programs and carbon taxing.271 Then, it will discuss how the
Environmental Standing Doctrine will translate those emission reduction
frameworks into injunctive relief.272
The European Union employs a cap-and-trade system and carbon taxing.273
Both methods assign a price to carbon emissions.274 The European Union’s capand-trade program (“E.U. ETS”) sets a maximum limit on carbon emission
quantities.275 The trading system allows carbon emission credit trading between
companies, thereby creating a carbon emission market.276 That market functions
by lowering the emissions cap to ensure that less carbon emissions occur over
time.277 Carbon taxing, on the other hand, functions as a set price that determines
how much an emitter must pay per one ton of greenhouse gas emissions.278 A
carbon tax functions by monetarily incentivizing businesses and consumers to
invest in green energy and lower their emissions to avoid higher taxes.279
conscious policies).
266. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
267. See infra Subsection IV.B.2.
268. See Goldberg et al., supra note 254, at 5111.
269. Tax or Trade: Revisiting the Trade-Offs in Climate Policy Options, RES. FOR FUTURE,
https://www.rff.org/events/all-events/tax-or-trade-revisiting-the-trade-offs-in-climate-policy-options/(last
visited Aug. 31, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
270. Id.
271. See infra Subsection IV.B.2.ii.
272. See infra Subsection IV.B.2.ii.
273. See A. Kristina Zvinys, Energy Taxes and the EU’s Cap-and-Trade System, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 19,
2020), https://taxfoundation.org/new-research-impact-energy-taxes-eus-cap-trade-system/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that carbon taxing is taxes added to the cost of polluting carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. EU ETS Handbook, EUR. COMM’N 22 (2015), https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/default/files/docs/ets
_handbook_en.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
278.
Carbon Tax Basics, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS (2017),
https://www.c2es.org/content/carbon-tax-basics/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2021) (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review).
279. Id.
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The judiciary does not have the authority to enact a cap-and-trade or carbon
taxing system.280 In fact, the U.S. does not have a national emission reductions
system, which is part of the reason why remedying climate change harms is such
a novel obstacle.281 But the U.S. judiciary can translate emission reduction market
policies into injunctive relief in climate change litigation.282 Without a national
cap-and-trade or carbon taxing system, the U.S. judiciary urgently needs to use
injunctions to provide emission reduction remedies.283
A remedy should provide relief as justice requires to protect legally recognized
rights; where there is a right, there is a remedy.284 Emission reduction injunctions
are available remedies because anything that lowers emissions is an appropriate
remedy for mitigating climate change injuries under the Environmental Standing
Doctrine.285 An injunction is a remedy directing a defendant to act or refrain from
action.286 When a permanent injunction orders affirmative conduct—like placing
a payable tax on carbon emissions—it is a mandatory injunction.287 A permanent
prohibitory injunction, on the other hand, prohibits an act—like limiting a
polluter’s carbon emission percentage annually.288
Courts determine if a permanent injunction is the proper remedy by asking: (1)
was there irreparable injury; (2) are remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) considering the balance of
hardships, is a remedy in equity warranted; and (4) is the relief in the public
interest?289 If courts answer each question affirmatively, a permanent injunction is
a proper remedy.290 The Environmental Standing Doctrine would encourage
courts, upon request, to issue a permanent injunction to mitigate irreparable harm
to the environment, thereby satisfying irreparable injury and inadequate remedy at
law—questions one and two.291 Additionally, the Environmental Standing
Doctrine would establish that equity is warranted and in the public interest because

280.
Market-Based State Policy, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
https://www.c2es.org/content/market-based-state-policy/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2021) (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review).
281. Id.
282. Id. (describing the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative that includes ten northeastern states and the
individual cap and trade and emission programs employed by California and Washington).
283. Joseph E. Aldy, Mobilizing Political Action on Behalf of Future Generations, FUTURE CHILD. 157
(2016), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jaldy/files/mobilizingpoliticalaction.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2021) (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
284. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389–392 (1971).
285. See Stone, supra note 190, at 455.
286. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 305–310 (1982).
287. Id.; see Carbon Tax Basics, supra note 278.
288. See EU ETS Handbook, supra note 277, at 16.
289. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312.
290. Id.
291. Id.

203

2021 / Standing up for Our Planet
a healthy and safe environment is a natural human right—questions three and
four.292
The U.S. judiciary, upon plaintiffs’ request, could utilize prohibitory
injunctions to reduce emissions.293 Courts have the authority to enjoin defendants
from emitting a certain percentage of emissions annually.294 Courts can also issue
mandatory injunctions to tax defendants based on their annual carbon output.295
The Environmental Standing Doctrine would emphasize the judiciary’s injunctive
remedies to create a judicial emission reduction framework in the context of
climate change litigation.296 In theory, the judicial remedies would work in
conjunction with any future national emission reduction framework.297
V. CONCLUSION
Climate change injuries require an updated doctrine to pave the way for
proactive legal steps.298 The new Environmental Standing Doctrine would allow
standing where there is: (1) an environmental injury, (2) caused by climate change,
and (3) redressable by emission reduction remedies.299 An Environmental Standing
Doctrine is necessary to remedy environmental harms through climate change
litigation.300 Greater impact on the planet comes with greater responsibility.301 This
generation’s challenge is to prove maturity and mastery not of nature, but of
mankind.302
Current development and use of natural resources pose potential inequity to
future generations.303 Future generations are not represented in today’s
environmental decision-making processes.304 Inadequate representation
encourages a depletion of natural resources and degradation in the quality of
resources for future generations.305
The Environmental Standing Doctrine would broaden injury-in-fact by giving
environmental entities standing in their own right.306 Additionally, the remedy

292.
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, at 3 (June 1972).
293. See generally Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1159 (illustrating the danger of courts not allowing redressability
in the form of injunctive relief to reduce carbon emissions).
294. See Wilensky, supra note 197, at 31.
295. Id. at 23.
296. Id. at 41.
297. Id.
298. See Lutz & McCaffrey, supra note 18, at 561.
299. Id. at 564.
300. See supra Part IV.
301. See WEISS ET AL., supra note 2, at 52.
302. See Carson, supra note 44, at 100.
303. See WEISS ET AL., supra note 2, at 48.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See supra Section IV.A.
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under this new doctrine would take the form of injunctions that reduce emissions
through enjoining emissions by annual percentages and imposing carbon taxes.307
Redressability under the Environmental Standing Doctrine is sufficient if it works
towards slowing climate change’s progression—slowing the rate of carbon
emissions into the atmosphere.308 An Environmental Standing Doctrine is
necessary to facilitate climate change litigation in the courts because the current
Standing Doctrine is no longer relevant as applied to environmental cases.309

307. See supra Section IV.B.
308. See Stone, supra note 190, at 456.
309. See supra Section III.B.
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